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Abstract: Understanding how terrorist networks are created and how individuals turn into extremism and then into 
terrorism is a current subject of interest and a cross-domain research problem since it involves scholars from 
political sciences, sociology, physics and computer scientists among others. In this paper, an agent-based 
approach is used to simulate the process of radicalization and creation of a terrorist network, and the link 
between both processes. Each citizen has several attributes allowing the model to take into account 
heterogeneous profiles of individual. Furthermore, we model the social transfer that takes place during the 
interaction of individuals in order to understand how cultural ideas are transmitted. This paper also provides 
a non-exhaustive but detailed survey of the state of the art on the agent-based terrorist networks modelling. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
We have seen in the last years an increase of news 
related to terrorism issues, and it is nowadays 
considered as one of the main global issues. This is 
the case of France in particular, where the fight 
against the terrorism is the second main 
preoccupation of the population (Lévy, et al., 2016), 
specially after the terrorist attacks suffered recently. 
Nevertheless, extremism principles and its 
corresponding practice implementation – terrorism – 
have existed long before in another form and with 
others goals. For example, in the late 20th century 
some regional terrorist groups as Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain or Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) in Ireland had the main attention of 
regional media. 
Terrorist Networks (TN) works can be studied 
according to several points of views, methodologies 
and goals, doing its classification very complex, and 
could even lead to a publication on this subject. A 
first look can be taken by type of approach: 
quantitative vs. qualitative, even if some authors 
support a combined approach (Crossley, 2010). 
Quantitative studies try to find a model that explains 
the system withouth taking into account the 
purposeful action of actors. On another side, the 
qualitative approach focuses on the context in which 
the relationships are created within the network and 
the different types of links. Qualitative studes 
(Taylor, 2010) try to explain how the particular 
situation of actors at every moment drives the 
structure of networks (Hidalgo, 2016). The focus can 
also be made on the diffusion of behaviors within a 
network, as (Deffuant, et al., 2002) (Holme and 
Newman, 2006). Likewise, there are some 
contributions on terrorist behavior modelling 
(Taylor, 2010). 
Most of the work done on TN takes the network 
as a macro macro object where the structure cannot 
emerge from heterogeneous egos, hence the utility 
of an agent-based approach. Agent-based simulation 
models make possible to analyse the macroscopic 
effects of the heterogeneous agents’ interactions. 
There are some papers in the literature that deal with 
TN using an agent-based simulation approach. 
Among them, different topics that can be analysed: 
radicalization (MacKerrow, 2003) (North, et al., 
2004), recruitment (Berry, et al., 2004) (Li, et al., 
2015), operational tasks and roles (O'Neil, 2012) (Li, 
et al., 2015), knowledge acquisition (Moon and 
Carley, 2007), counter-terrorism (Keller, et al., 
2010) (Ilachinski, 2012). 
Nevertheless, none of papers described above 
focuses on the simulation of TN formation process 
as a subject of study, combining at the same time the 
diffusion of radicalism, heterogeneous behaviours 
and micro-macro mechanisms modifying the form of 
the network. The model presented in this paper deals 
with these issues. Moreover, cultural transfers and 
meeting mechanisms are introduced. 
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 
we discuss in detail about agent-based simulation 
approaches and propose a set of key aspects when 
modelling TN; in section 3 our model is presented 
and compared to other papers through these key 
aspects; then in section 4 show some results. Finally, 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 AGENT-BASED SIMULATIONS 
OF TERRORIST NETWORKS 
Since the complexity and variety of agent-based 
models of TN, we propose in the next paragraph a 
detail of central questions and common aspects that 
are studied in the state of the art and discuss about 
them. The papers analysed here have been selected 
in order to match all the specifications of our 
research: and agent-based simulation, the notion of 
social network and modelling of terrorism. 
Each paper focuses more often in a central 
question that represents the main idea (ex. Counter-
terrorism) responding at the same time to some other 
aspects that can often be common to other papers 
(ex. How are the links created?). These aspects have 
been chosen in order to fit with the actual interest in 
this paper, that is the network formation. 
Thus, the following main questions and common 
aspects have been identified. 
2.1 Main Questions 
2.1.1 Counter Terrorism 
One of the most important questions addressed in 
TN studies is the development, analyse and 
simulation of counter-terrorism strategies. 
(Raczynski, 2004) introduces the infiltration of 
counter-terrorist agents within the TN, together with 
the possibility of some terrorist agents collaborating 
with anti-terrorist structures. Therefore, terrorist 
agents can be neutralized leading to the destruction 
of terror structures. (Ilachinski, 2012) developed an 
exhaustive framework taking into account different 
dynamics, and it focuses on the co-evolution of both 
terrorist and counter-TN, using some measures as 
entropy, vulnerability or cohesion. Moreover, 
counter-terrorist agents can detect, infiltrate and 
capture terrorist agents and/or links. (Tsvetovat and 
Carley, 2004) simulates the behaviour of the terrorist 
structure under attacks aiming to destabilize the 
network. In order to do it, the anti-terrorism agents 
have two goals: to learn the structure, tasks and 
knowledge distribution of terrorists and to remove 
and isolate terrorist agents. Regarding the first goal, 
there are 3 ways of intercepting information spread 
through the TN (random, snowball and socially 
intelligent traffic analysis). Once the counter-
terrorist agents have enough information about the 
TN, they can attack a random point, the one with the 
highest degree centrality or cognitive load. (Genkin 
and Gutfraind, 2011) studies different profiles (lone 
and trapped wolfs, wolf and trapped wolf packs) and 
scenarios of radicalization through isolation, 
clustering and mean cell size measures. Occlusion 
and encapsulation mechanisms are explained from a 
SNA point of view and presented as counter-
terrorism strategies. (Keller, et al., 2010) analyses 4 
counter-terrorism strategies and their corresponding 
response from terrorist agents: leader-focused, 
grassroots, geographic and random. Terrorist agents 
modify their parameters in order to protect 
themselves from these attacks. For example, they 
increase the cost of creating new links in the case of 
a leader-focused anti-terrorist strategy, since having 
too many links is problematic. The same strategy is 
adopted by terrorist agents in (O'Neil, 2012), where 
highly exposed terrorist agents are killed or captured 
et each simulation step. Each terrorist agent has a 
secrecy attribute, that reflects the agent’s ability to 
remain unexposed. Regarding (Li, et al., 2015), the 
counter-terrorism aspect is taken into account by 
allowing the network to be recovered after an attack. 
The TN can be perturbed by eliminating either a 
leader or a regular member of a terrorist cell, and the 
reconstruction process is explained. 
2.1.2 Behaviour Diffusion 
Modelling the terrorist’s behaviour and its diffusion 
is another approach used for studying TN formation. 
Behaviour and opinion are two related concepts that 
can raise some confusions. In this paper, an agent 
behaviour and opinion is equivalent, and is 
completely defined through its characteristic vectors 
of characteristics (cf. paragraph 3.2). 
(MacKerrow, 2003) focus in social bargaining 
process that allows a bottom-up approach for belief 
spreading. He also introduces the grievance toward a 
social group using socio-economic and cultural-
penetration metrics, and the notions of social welfare 
and social capital, as well as a social pressure. 
(Berry, et al., 2004) developed a whole framework 
to model behaviour diffusion. Agents’ 
disgruntlement evolves according to its personal 
network, society attitude, mosques they are member 
of and finally the clique behaviour, that is the 
behaviour of agents surrounding it. Disgruntlement 
changes following a linear reinforcement and/or 
linear attraction. (Genkin and Gutfraind, 2011) 
model the pressurability on an agent, that measures 
how fast an individual changes his opinions 
according to his friends’ ones, an essential notion in 
order to model how a moderate agent becomes a 
radical one. 
2.1.3 Operations, Tasks and Roles 
An important part of TN studies is focusing about 
the objective of their members. Some papers take 
into account the organization of a terrorist attack by 
modelling different roles, tasks or necessary 
operations in order to perform a mission. 
(O'Neil, 2012) and (Li, et al., 2015) develop a 
whole framework dedicated to operations, roles and 
tasks, with hierarchical structures and leader 
selection process. (Ilachinski, 2012) developed a 
model of TN as a complex adaptive system, with 
very complex roles, missions and dynamics. 
(Raczynski, 2004) uses a probability of terrorist 
attack based on the size of the TN as well as the 
number of existing terrorist-supporting structures. 
(Tsvetovat and Carley, 2004) model different tasks 
and its assignation to agents through a meta-matrix. 
Concerning (Moon and Carley, 2007), the objective 
of individuals is knowledge acquisition (a pre-
condition to a terrorist attack). 
2.1.4 Recruitment 
In order to become a terrorist, a radical agent in 
(Berry, et al., 2004) has to belong to a radical clique 
and to be contacted by a “bridge” agent, that is an 
agent who allows to interact with a terrorist 
organization. A similar idea is used by (MacKerrow, 
2003), where an agent has to be radicalized before 
contacting a terrorist organization. Moreover 
(MacKerrow, 2003) proposes a parameter of “self-
motivation toward terrorism” that allow some agents 
to require more or less active recruitment. (Li, et al., 
2015) introduces a recruitment cell that 
communicates with other cells in order to know 
about human resources needs.  They define also the 
processes of recruitment and a parameter of 
recruitment cost. (O'Neil, 2012) take also into 
account a recruiter role and proposes a mechanism 
of replacement of a leader. 
2.2 Common Aspects 
In order to answer the previous questions, we have 
identified some more general aspects tackled by 
authors. These aspects are not the main issue of 
respective papers but they are however necessary to 
answer some central questions. The first three (Link 
creation, Structure and process relation and 
Topology) correspond to network formation related 
issues, and the last two (Multilayer and In/Out data) 
are more methodological. 
2.2.1 Link Creation 
This is the most important step in a simulation 
model of network formation. 
(Berry, et al., 2004) calculates the weight of a 
relationship between two agents, based on the 
disgruntlement level of agents and their personal 
traits. A link is created from a certain threshold. 
(MacKerrow, 2003) uses a social bargaining 
between agents since they seek to get into a leader’s 
network, that is someone with a lot of relationships, 
so creating a link has a “social cost”. (Raczynski, 
2004) creates a link when agents are spatially close, 
and this is more likely when they are in cities, an 
abstract agent of his model. (North, et al., 2004) 
focus on the inference from incomplete network 
data, together with some social network rules and 
detailed documentation about interactions between 
agents. (Ilachinski, 2012) link dynamics is based in 
one hand on the theory of communication of (Monge 
and Contractor, 2003), that is social reward and 
mission gain, and in the other hand in an equation 
calculating the perceived risk of creating a link. 
Furthermore, agents have some motivations to create 
or erase links, as acquiring mission-required 
resources or the perceived risk of discovery. 
(Tsvetovat and Carley, 2004) and (Moon and Carley, 
2007) give a detailed equation to select the best 
candidate to create a link to and also a probability of 
interaction based on differences between agents’ 
attributes, social distance and spatial proximity. 
(Genkin and Gutfraind, 2011) follows the “never 
swap a good friend” rule. This is based on 
homophily, magnets (the equivalent of social spots 
in this paper), degree budget (maximum of 
connections by agent), transitivity and an attrition 
parameter measuring the migration rate of radicals 
among different communities. (Keller, et al., 2010) 
applies the preferential attachment principle. 
(O'Neil, 2012) shows a formula calculating the 
weight of links, based on agents’ roles and locations. 
Moreover, there is a mechanism controlling the 
macro behaviour of the network, depending on the 
success of terrorist operations. (Li, et al., 2015) 
specifies some scenarios where a link can be created. 
For example, when an agent transfers a resource 
from a cell to another, links created by terrorist 
recruitment cells when they capture new terrorist, 
and the designation of a new leader. 
2.2.2 Structure and Process Relation 
Some authors explain how network’s structure and 
agents’ behaviours interact, independently of link 
creation process. 
For example, in (O'Neil, 2012) the network 
structure changes according to the issue of 
operations. In (Li, et al., 2015), the network is re-
structured after the counter-terrorism attacks. 
(Genkin and Gutfraind, 2011) identifies radical 
profiles as well as counter-terrorism strategies using 
SNA measures and the position of agents in the 
network. Agents in (Moon and Carley, 2007) change 
its behaviour and goal according to its position in the 
space, since they seek for knowledge and resources 
distributed over the geographical space. (Berry, et 
al., 2004) models an inter-relation between cliques 
and agents’ behaviours, that is these two entities 
influence each other at the same time. Finally, the 
structure of the network in (Ilachinski, 2012) 
depends on roles, operations and the battlefield 
context. 
2.2.3 Network’s Topology 
Regarding the structure of the obtained networks in 
analysed papers, it is difficult to stablish a consensus 
about the actual topology of TN. 
(MacKerrow, 2003) (Berry, et al., 2004) 
(Tsvetovat and Carley, 2004) (Genkin and 
Gutfraind, 2011) (Li, et al., 2015)obtain 
cellular/clique based networks. (Raczynski, 2004) 
obtain a tree structure. (Moon and Carley, 2007) 
follows a spatial structure. (Keller, et al., 2010) uses 
a preferential attachment rule so he obtains a scale-
free network. Finally, (North, et al., 2004) 
(Ilachinski, 2012) (O'Neil, 2012) allow their model 
to create any kind of topology, depending on 
parameters or existing prior data. 
2.2.4 Multilayer Networks 
As discussed before, qualitative approaches are 
interested in the type and motivation of relationship 
between individuals, and multilayer structures are 
the natural way of taking into account these details. 
Furthermore, there are more and more mathematical 
formalizations of multilayer networks (De 
Domenico, et al., 2013). 
Regarding terrorist multilayer networks, 
(MacKerrow, 2003) defines kinship, religious, 
organizational and friendship layer. (Berry, et al., 
2004) observes the following layers according to the 
weight or strength of the link between individuals, in 
ascending order by strength: world, mosque, 
acquaintance, strong bonds and clique. (Ilachinski, 
2012) proposes a more complex layer division, with 
3 different layers oriented to a counter-terrorism 
strategy: genotype (primitive agent behaviour), 
phenotype I (emergent agent behaviour) and 
phenotype II (emergent squad and force behaviour). 
Moreover, agents in his framework perform actions 
in two different spaces: physical and information 
one. Finally, (Tsvetovat and Carley, 2004) and 
(Moon and Carley, 2007) uses a meta-matrix 
approach allowing to take into account agents, 
knowledges, resources, locations and tasks. 
2.2.5 In/out Data 
(Berry, et al., 2004)does not precise any input data, 
however a similar paper (Berry, et al., 2003) 
discusses about using available data from urban 
street gangs as an analogy of terrorist groups. 
(MacKerrow, 2003) uses census data, interviews and 
GIS data in his model in order to initialize attributes 
like ethnography, income, religion, educational 
degree, etc. Likewise, the allegiance vector is built 
from qualitative data. (North, et al., 2004) generates 
a TN from a sample of a given network. (Moon and 
Carley, 2007) describes the input data set as the 
result of an automatic process of analysis of 
unclassified documents like newspaper articles or 
intelligence reports using AutoMap text analysis 
tool. Regarding spatial information, they hand coded 
corresponding latitudes and longitudes. (O'Neil, 
2012) extracts information from JJATT database 
(doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/) in order to define 
agent’s roles. Moreover, since his model mimics real 
world networks, the Jemaah Islamiyah network from 
JJATT was used as initial network. (Keller, et al., 
2010) models counter-terrorism strategies based on 
empirical ones. (Ilachinski, 2012) doesn’t put any 
data in his model but the topology and dynamic of 
his model have been developed following 
operational and ground knowledge. (Genkin and 
Gutfraind, 2011) does not use any real data as input 
of the model, however the results are partially 
validated by empirical data and radical profiles are 
based on empirical cases of home-grown self-starter 
terrorism. This data comes from some available 
datasets as Lexis-Nexis, TRC or START among 
others. NetWatch package, presented in (Tsvetovat 
and Carley, 2005) and (Tsvetovat and Carley, 2004), 
generates synthetic TN based on real network data. 
As case of study, they show the generative model of 
the September 11th hijackers dataset collected by 
(Krebs, 2001). Real data is also used to describe the 
terrorist attack strategies, that is sequences of tasks, 
resource management, etc. 
Table 1 sums up the precedents paragraphs. 
3 MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The model described below is a GAMA 
implementation based on (Berry, et al., 2004). 
GAMA is a modelling and simulation platform 
(Grignard, et al., 2013) that allows modellers and 
experts in numerous domains (ecology, social 
sciences, etc.) to build complex models without 
strong computer sciences skills, thanks to high-level 
modelling language, supporting the integration of 
multiple level of agency and realistic environments. 
Nevertheless, even if some aspects as social spot 
stickiness or social similarity (cf. next paragraphs) 
are common to (Berry, et al., 2004), the main goal of 
this paper is to show a mechanism of network 
formation and not only the recruitment of terrorist 
through clique detection. Moreover, this paper 
focuses on cultural vector or social transfer and 
meeting mechanisms. 
3.1 Entities 
3.1.1 Social Spots 
Social spots represent places where behaviour 
diffusion takes place. During the simulation, agents 
can attend a social spot. In order to choose a social 
spot, a stickiness (Berry, et al., 2004) percentage is 
computed. This value depends on agent personality 
and social spot ideology. A social spot ideology is 
defined from its members’ zeal and cultural vector, 
and from its own cultural vector. This last value can 
represent the personality of the social spot leader, or 
some trait well known about the social spot. For 
example, one can have a certain a priori about a 
social place independently of the existence of a 
leader. 
3.1.2 Agents 
An agent’s personality is defined by fixed attributes 
like age, sex, religion, etc.  and a cultural vector 
similar to the allegiance vector presented by 
(MacKerrow, 2003) that describes cultural traits, 
that is the opinion about some specific 
organizations, countries, etc. Moreover, an agent has 
a value of zeal, which is defined as a measure of 
agent’s political violence (Genkin and Gutfraind, 
2011). Zeal value allows to make a difference 
between an extremist passive agent and an active 
one. An agent with a very high zeal value is ready to 
becomes a terrorist. This is similar to the 
disgruntlement value described by (Berry, et al., 
2004). Zeal evolves every time two agents meet, in 
function of their current zeal values. For example, if 
both agents are radicals, they mutually increase their 
zeal. 
“Society” is a special kind of agent based on 
(Berry, et al., 2004) that influences agents at each 
simulation step. This influence has an impact in the 
agent’s cultural vector depending on its social 
pressure sensibility value. Society agent allows us to 
model the macro mechanism taking place in the 
network formation process. 
3.2 Dynamics 
The dynamic of the model is fully described by 3 
processes: dynamic related to the social network that 
is the formation of links, the attending to a social 
spot and the social transfer between agents. These 
dynamics are computed sequentially (discrete event 
simulation) Every dynamic influences the other, 
since for example an agent will create a link with 
other agent depending on a score taking into account 
if they are in the same social spot and the similarity 
between their cultural vectors. 
3.2.1 Link Creation 
The model allows agents to meet in different ways. 
First, they can do random meetings with a certain 
probability (Tsvetovat and Carley, 2005). Otherwise, 
there are two meeting or dynamic mechanisms: 
a. According to the social similarity
Here, a social similarity measure is used to 
decide whether two random agents are able to create 
(or remove if below a threshold) a link between 
them within the social network. Social similarity is 
based on the similarity equation presented in (Berry, 
et al., 2004) and network measures like shared 
friends, homophily and degrees.  
b. According to agent’s opinion
The model presented in (Holme and Newman, 
2006) is used to compute the dynamics of opinions. 
At each simulation step, an agent has two 
possibilities: Either to switch one of his links by 
another one (that is remove one link and create 
another one) that allow it to connect with an agent 
having the same opinion or to replace his own 
opinion by the opinion of one of its neighbours, 
keeping the same link. 
3.2.2 Attending a Social Spot 
An agent can belong to a social spot if a “stickiness” 
score is high enough to attend it. This score is based 
on (Berry, et al., 2004) with a modification allowing 
to take into account both fixed characteristic and 
cultural vectors. 
3.2.3 Social Transfer 
The social transfer mechanisms allow agents to 
communicate and exchange their cultural values, 
what will have an impact in the other dynamics 
(creating links and attending a social spot). 
The current version of the model described here 
uses Axelrod model for the dissemination of culture 
(Axelrod, 1997), which allows to change one value 
of the cultural vector at each interaction. 
4 RESULTS 
The following results show how a network is formed 
through a radicalization process depending on the 
social meeting mechanism used. The red dots 
represent radical people and the white ones are 
neutral people. For theses simulations, we have 
initialized a population of 20 agents, 17 of which are 
neutrals and 3 radicals. This size corresponds to a 
neighbourhood scale simulation, where opinions can 
diverge, be homogenized, evolve, etc. We think this 
is a good trade-off between a large-scale simulation 
as a region or inter-countries simulation 
(MacKerrow, 2003) or a more restricted simulation 
within a small group of 5-10 participants as many 
sociological works. 
Cultural and fixed vectors and zeal values are 
initialized randomly between [-1,1], and social 
pressure sensibility is minimal in the case of radical 
agents, that is they are totally convinced in their 
cause and can’t be neutralized. In this simulation, 
there is a radical social spot and a neutral one, so its 
cultural vectors correspond to its ideologies. 
Moreover, the society agent influences some random 
agents at each simulation step. This influence 
changes some values of cultural vector in order to 
radicalize the agent. 
As explained above, there are two mechanisms 
for agents to meet. The first one, based on a social 
similarity metric, generates a network with two main 
components: a clique of neutral people and another 
one of radicals Figure 1. 
This is an expected result since the model is 
based on Berry’s (Berry, et al., 2004) which aims to 
show the clique based structure of a TN. More 
interesting is the evolution of the structure through 
the simulation. One can observe that on t=75 there 
are two communities of neutral people. This is due 
to the existence of two different social spots, but 
there is a homogenization process over the 
simulation that bring together all neutral people in 
one single clique. Concerning radical people, there is 
a one person who was radicalized between t=0 and 
t=75. Nevertheless, radicals don’t create a network 
as quickly as neutrals. This can be explained with 
the zeal parameter. Actually, one can be radical 
because of different raisons, but the probability of 
creating a link between two radicals is higher when 
the zeal level is similar, that is when they are ready 
to become an actual terrorist, meaning ready to 
perform a terror act. There are also some contacts 
between radical and non-radical people, but they 
become increasingly rare. 
Figure 2 corresponds to the network formation 
process using Axelrod combined with (Holme and 
Newman, 2006). The obtained structure is 
completely different compared to the previous one. 
People are more dynamic and choose their contacts 
giving more importance to the opinion. Opinions 
change in a more dynamic way, and the result is a 
population with more radicals. Some people keep 
their opinion and remain isolated from the main 
component, that was not possible with the previous 
model. This can be explained because social spots 
have less impact on people behaviour, since people 
are less devoted to the behaviour supported by social 
spots and more on people’s one. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes a model of terrorism network 
construction, with mechanisms allowing the 
diffusion of cultural values, social meetings and 
radicalization. We showed how the diffusion of 
radical behaviour is related to the formation of the 
network and vice-versa.  
Axelrod model is used for the cultural transfer 
between agents. However, other models of social 
transfer as (Schleussner, et al., n.d.) (MacKerrow, 
2003) (Deffuant, et al., 2002) are being developed 
and adapted to our model in order to compare the 
resulting networks. 
Some important questions in terrorism as 
operations, tasks and roles could be added to our 
model as separated modules. Similarly, we could 
study the multilayer structure of the society, 
allowing us to discover more details about the 
radicalization process. 
Finally, the model is easily adaptable to others 
multi-agent platforms or high-level computer 
languages 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1: Network formation using Axelrod model of social transfer combined with social similarity based mechanism of 
meetings. 
Figure 2: Network formation using Axelrod model of social transfer combined with Holme’s model (Holme and Newman, 
2006) of opinion diffusion. 
Table 1: Detail of key features by paper. 
